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Summary  
This paper explores trends shown by technology based companies in the Cambridge area over the cycles 
of the past two decades. Influences from the macro-economy include the impact of the information 
revolution on the area, the recession of the early 1990s and the technology crash of 2000. The expansion 
of the cluster of Cambridge tech firms over time reflects the extent to which firm entries have exceeded 
exits since the 1960s and the high survival rates of new firms.  There has been sector-specific volatility in 
the current decade, pre-figuring economic difficulties since evident elsewhere. In order to reveal the 
dynamics behind trends at the cluster level, data are examined by sector, size and cohort. This shows that 
the decline in firm numbers between 2002 and 2006 reflects the founding of large numbers of short-lived 
IT software firms during the technology boom.  
 Branches of corporations headquartered elsewhere have increasingly been attracted to the area 
but the larger tech based businesses in the Cambridge area are found to be those long-standing to 
Cambridge. Branch firms were more prone to closure and relocation than the larger indigenous firms 
with their accumulated local competence. Biotech and R&D experienced steady growth through the 
1990s and 2000s with an increase in firm and job numbers. The biotechnology sector contracted along 
with the recent reduction in venture capital but  the R&D sector continued to grow. 
 Cambridge technology firms have been attractive targets for acquisition by corporations seeking 
to improve their innovation performance by buying promising technology.  The number of acquisitions 
rose during the boom years, particularly in Biotech and IT, with associated cutbacks in employment in 
acquired units. The boom in venture capital investment and the incidence of acquisition during the boom 
period may be related. VCs seek early exit from their investments and acquisition rates fell along with 
the fall in local venture capital funding.  
  After 2004, the fall in the number of tech start-ups (as compared with  county VAT registrations 
for all new firms) and increasing numbers of exits, indicate that Cambridge tech-based firms were 
experiencing pressures specific to high tech.   Long term effects of lower firm entries will depend on 
survival rates and the growth of surviving firms. During the recession of the early 1990s, a smaller cohort 
of tech start-ups achieved higher survival rates than those started in boom years.  The number of new 
firms active in emerging technology sectors points to continuing innovation and diversity among firms in 
the Cambridge technology cluster despite a contraction in numbers of start-ups which anticipated the 
economic downturn. In the current financial situation, knowledge based firms engaged in technological 
and creative activity are more important than ever as providers of exports and of the skills of the future. 
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The Cambridge High Tech Cluster: 
resilience and response to cyclical trends 
 
Introduction  
Innovative economic activity is stimulated by scientific and engineering research only under certain 
conditions.   R&D must give rise to new goods and services either from established or entrepreneurial 
ventures meeting specialist demand in the international economy (OECD 2000; Mowery and Rosenberg 
1998; Best 2000). Cambridge tech-based firms have been hailed as demonstrating that new applications 
of knowledge can generate important innovations in local clusters of innovative firms (Minshall 2008; 
Library House 2006). In economic history, emerging and early diffusing tech firms (high tech clusters) 
followed broad cyclical patterns, but with amplified growth during economic upturns and sharp sector-
specific downturns.  With this in mind we explore trends in firm and job numbers in technology based 
firms in the Cambridge area in relation to the recession of the early 1990s, the expansion of the late 
1990s and the economic volatility of the current decade.  We find that Cambridge tech firms were 
relatively resilient to cyclical pressures during the 1980s and 1990s but that there was sector-specific 
volatility in the current decade, pre-figuring economic difficulties that have since become evident 
elsewhere in the economy.  
 
Why are firms that base their activities on emerging and newly diffusing technologies (high tech firms) 
prone to economic cycles? Sector-specific booms and business cycles have been associated with 
emerging technologies since the industrial revolution. As pioneering technologies come to win customers 
and eventually bring in returns to early investors, they attract further investment. With diffusion of the 
technology, above average profits are eroded with the onset of competition. Inflated expectations 
subside, often marked by a collapse of investment support.  Booms and slumps are not merely a response 
to macro conditions (Atella, et al.2008).  They have also been set off by the emergence of major 
technologies since the early days of canal and railroad transport (Nairn 2002; Baines et al 2003).  
Confidence was eventually restored when further sales and returns reassured investors and the 
technology continued to be diffused (Nairn 2000; Gartner 2006). Since new technologies tend to swarm 
(Schumpeter 1928), this syndrome may work its way through a swathe of related technologies, as 
occurred during the Internet boom and crash around the year 2000.   
 
Cyclical influences have until recently been neglected in cluster studies. Cycles at the macro level do not 
map directly onto local trends in firm and job numbers (Audretsch and and Acs 1994). Economic cycles 
are tracked by such indicators as rates of GNP growth and changes in share prices, but the relationship 
between these factors and local trends is complex, because of the multiplicity of other influences to 
which young technology firms are subject. They are affected by factors which include local 
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infrastructure, local industry shifts, investment patterns and skill availability. Attempts to isolate and 
model the impact of such variables with limited data availability could result in spurious precision 
(Collard and Dellas 2007). Our aim is simply to examine recent trends in a well known high tech cluster, 
using a longitudinal business dataset, in order to identify discontinuities in the expansion and contraction 
of technology-based firms and jobs, against the background of cyclical influences  
 
Overview of trends in technology based activity in the Cambridge Area 
The expansion of high tech activity in Cambridge coincided with the information revolution.  Earlier 
studies have shown that Cambridge was a pioneering centre of advanced computing power which was 
made available to private firms through time-sharing arrangements provided by the university’s 
government-funded Atlas Computer (Garnsey and Cannon-Brookes 1992, Garnsey and Heffernan 2005).   
A number of IT enterprises were founded in the late 1970s and the 1980s, contributing to the rapid rise in 
numbers of tech based firms in the area over the latter decade. The location of the government CAD 
centre gave rise to enterprise in Computer Aided Design, resulting in the spin-out of a number of 
companies, including Cambridge Interactive Systems. These pioneering companies were acquired as 
CAD matured and the international CAD industry consolidated. Some of the acquired firms were 
relocated and closed. However knowledge developed by entrepreneurs and engineers active in CAD was 
applied to Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and other information technologies, with the founding 
of such firms as Smallworld and the recruitment of CAD engineers into many other local IT companies.    
 
Long-lived spin-outs from the university engineering department, Cambridge Instruments and Pye, the 
radio and instruments company, were founded in the nineteenth century and the 1930s, respectively. 
Both experienced problems in making the transition from the electro-mechanical technologies to 
applying information technology throughout their systems and were subject to merger and acquisitions as 
their industries consolidated, with the loss of several thousand jobs in Cambridge in the early 1990s.    
Government assistance was available through Manufacturing Modernisation programmes in US (Best 
1999) and subsidies to German engineering firms to encourage the transition to IT based systems. US 
and German companies became leading customers of the Cambridge CAD companies’ pioneering CAD 
products like MEDUSA. In the UK, the Thatcher government was retreating from government assistance 
to industry.  The local instruments sector did not fully recover from the closures and drastic downsizing 
of the larger instruments firms in Cambridge. However the downsized companies became a source of 
experienced managers for local firms founded in the area to exploit new information technologies. 
 
 The rise and fall in numbers in the recession of the early 1990s is reflected in our longitudinal dataset on 
technology based firms in Cambridgeshire (Figure 1).1 
 
                                                
1  The Appendix describes the database 
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Figure 1  Total Number of High Tech Firms and Total High Tech Employment in Cambridgeshire 1988-2006  
 
During the recession of 1990-1992, Cambridge high tech activity was more resilient than activities in 
many other places. Nationally, there was a reduction in GDP of 2.5% and company earnings declined by 
25%. Unemployment rose from 6.9% in 1990 to 10.7% in 1993 (Office of National Statistics). The 
marked fall in jobs seen in figure 1 between 1990 and 1992 mainly took place in the few older, larger 
firms in the area. This was followed by a stabilisation in the number of firms. Entries of new firms soon 
resulted in expansion in numbers of tech based firms in the area, and employment had recovered by 
1994, as small new firms provided jobs that made up the numbers depleted in earlier job losses in the 
larger instruments firms (Garnsey and Cannon Brookes 1992).    
 
Analysis of entry and exit rates of firms in the area show a high rate of churn, with a hundred firms 
starting or closing in some years.  This instability underlies the aggregate trends in figure one.  From 
1996 to 2002 the net effects of exit and entry of tech-based firms contributed to cumulative growth in 
numbers while the international technology boom was in strong upswing.  Resilience was again in 
evidence during 2000 – 2002.  There was only a slight decrease in numbers of tech firms and jobs in the 
Cambridge area during the technology crash of 2000, with its dramatic share price rise and fall on the 
New York technology stock market. In the wider UK economy a recovery after the fall in GDP of 2004 
was fuelled by the boom in property prices.  High levels of start up indicated by county VAT 
registrations after 2004 was not experienced by Cambridge high tech companies (figure 2.) Among 
Cambridge tech firms new start-ups fell after 2004 to below the rate of start-ups measured by VAT 
registration of all new firms in Cambridgeshire (GCP, 2007), indicating that tech based firms were not 
benefiting from the factors associated with the property boom that were fuelling non-tech start-ups in the 
county. This is congruent with a fall after 2004 in the number of university start-ups, predominantly 
technology firms, as reported by Cambridge University Research Services.  
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Figure 2  Entries and exits of high tech firms and employees in Cambridgeshire between 1988 and 2006  
 
The contrast between VAT registrations among all start-ups in Cambridgeshire and the fall in tech start-
ups in Cambridgeshire after 2004 suggests that tech start-ups may have been disproportionately affected 
by financial stringency during the housing boom.  
 
Firms by Size Category 
Disaggregating firms by more detailed categories reveals some of the factors underlying the totals.  
Changes in firms size measured by employment between 1988 and 2006 (Figure 3) point to the 
constituents of changes at the cluster level. The size distribution shown in figure 3 is a percentage of the 
total number of firms for that year. 
 
Figure 3  Size Distribution of Cambridgeshire tech firms by year, 1988 to 2006    
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Analysis of firms by employment size shows that the aggregate fall in firm numbers after 2004 seen in 
Figure 1 reflects the fall in the smallest size category of 1- 4 employees (micro-firms), just as earlier 
expansion had been led by a boom in this category. In 2006 the percentage of firms in every size 
category other than micro (1- 4) was higher than in 2004.   
 
It is often remarked that there are few large tech based businesses there are in the Cambridge area (e.g. 
Owen 2004), The size distribution of Cambridge tech firms is actually less skewed in the direction of 
small firms than is the case nationally, where the preponderance of small firms is even greater (Garnsey 
and Heffernan 2005).  The shortage of established ‘anchor’ firms in the area is a matter of concern where 
these firms provide custom for other local firms and are better able to survive temporary downturns in 
their markets. However those establishments in the database most likely to cease trading in the area were 
implanted branch establishments which had the largest associated job loss on exit (figure 4), We explore 
this issue further below, in analysing changes in firm size. Larger firms founded in the area were more 
likely to remain in the area than were implants, even when the former experienced changes of ownership. 
Local branches set up in the area of firms headquartered elsewhere proved to be less well anchored than 
firms originating in the area. 
 
Figure 4.  Job losses of Cambridge tech firms active in 2004 but no longer present in 2006 by type of firm       
 
In Figure 5 evidence on micro-firms and on larger firms reveal their differential contribution to high tech 
employment trends in the area. Larger firms are the 20% of firms in the database (~250 each year out of 
2800) with the highest number of employees.  
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Figure 5   Number of Cambridgeshire tech firms by size of firm between 1988 and 2006   
 
Figure 5 removes the micro-firms from the analysis, revealing their strong contribution to aggregate firm 
numbers in contrast with employment. The largest 20% of firms were those providing most of the high 
tech employment in the area, but had a much less visible impact on firm number trends. In Cambridge as 
elsewhere, larger firms provide the bulk of jobs. For the largest 20% of firms examined, the number of 
firms mirrors the total employment trend shown in Figure 1.   
 
Between 2002 and 2004 (Figure 5) large numbers of very small firms were formed in Cambridge as 
recovery from the tech crash of 2000 occurred and the economy moved into upswing.  In contrast, 
between 2004 and 2006, the number of micro-firms fell by 124.  This decrease made up the major part of 
the total decrease of 155 in the number of technology firms in the database between 2004 and 2006. This 
effect on firm numbers and the drop in 2006 is also displayed by plotting the mean size of firm (Figure 
6). 
 
Figure 6  Firms with 1-4 Employees and mean size of firm comparison with total firms in Cambridgeshire   
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The fall in average size after 2004 and the rise in 2006 indicates that micro-firm start-ups was followed 
by closures – a pattern is confirmed by Figure 7 which shows micro-firms by their foundation year. 
 
Figure 7  High tech microfirms in Cambridgeshire in 2006   
 
In contrast with micro-firm trends, the larger firms are less likely to be new. Many long-standing firms of 
a larger than average size, of which there were 123 in total, had been based in Cambridgeshire since 1988 
or before (Figure 8). As regards start-ups, despite the downturn, it is striking that 74 companies (8% of 
total founded since 2000) started since 2000 were founded at a sufficiently large size, or had grown 
enough, to attain the size of the largest 20% of firms. 
 
To find out whether larger firms originated as indigenous start-ups or were moved into the area, we used 
archive sources and telephone interviews to examine the history of the 63 firms that achieved a size of 
over 100 employees.  
 
Figure 8  High tech larger firms existing in Cambridgeshire in 2006 by year founded   
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We found that most of the larger established firms had early indigenous roots in Cambridge (Figure 9.) 
rather than being attracted from elsewhere. This points to the value of competencies accumulated locally, 
persisting through changes of ownership in some cases. We have already seen that branches of implant 
firms are more likely to close than are indigenous larger firms. 
 
Figure 9  High tech firms with over 100 employees: indigenous vs. attracted establishments.2    
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Firms by Sector 
Firms are assigned to sectors on the basis of their SIC code. This coding system is unsatisfactory in many 
respects for tech based firms. For example, it does not identify whether the technologies are still early 
stage, or recently diffusing (McArthur 1988). However SIC codes do provide some indication of type of 
activity and allow for some comparison of categories of activity on a longitudinal basis. Figure 10 below 
shows the breakdown into sectors of activity of tech based firms in Cambridge. Biotechnology, unlike 
the other sectors, denotes a set of firms that are flagged individually rather than being based on SIC code, 
and overlaps some other categories, notably R&D.  
 
                                                
2 This evidence was obtained by sorting through the database followed by company history research. Companies 
with unknown or untraceable roots are flagged as unknown;  where there is some indication of roots but these are 
not proven they are added to the appropriate column (‘Indigenous’ or ‘Attracted’) as Unknown. 
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Figure 10  Number of tech-based firms and number of employees by sector in Cambridgeshire (high tech) 
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Numbers of tech firms in sectors other than software, Biotech and R&D were stable or expanded slowly 
through the 1990s, with no further growth and in some cases decline after 2000. IT firms, as pioneers and 
facilitators of high tech activity, have created the largest sector in the Cambridge area, by a significant 
margin in terms of firm numbers. However IT software firms greatly outnumbered the more capital 
intensive IT hardware firms which declined over the period (Garnsey and Heffernan 2005). In keeping 
with the fall in numbers between 2004 and 2006 and rise in average firm size, for IT software, the entry 
and exit pattern of firms is closely follows the pattern of entry and exit pattern of firms in all sectors 
(Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11  All firms entries and exits and IT software firm entries and exits  
 
Note:  Entries are new firms founded or firms moving into the area.  Exits are firms closed, merged or moved. 
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The boom period of rapid expansion was followed by many fewer IT software start-ups in the period 
between 2004 and 2006.  Aggregate trends for tech firms in the area were shaped by the number of very 
small IT firms started during the boom period. In principle it is desirable to have a large pool of firms 
experimenting with related applications of emerging technology. But the very small firms formed during 
the boom proved unsustainable. 
 
The relative immunity of Cambridge firms to the Internet crash between 2000 and 2002 was partly the 
result of relatively few high tech Internet firms having been founded in the area.3  E-business has a high 
failure rate and required a large pool to generate a few successes.  The pattern in Cambridge has been the 
creation of specialist firms in market niches with a relatively low failure rate, a different dynamic from 
that in larger population centres with more internet firms. As some e-businesses proved successful 
(among the many failures) and started to bring in returns to investors, there were few Cambridge firms 
among them.4 Nor does Cambridge have a tradition of IT applications in the creative industries.  The 
expansion of this sector elsewhere points to the benefit of bringing together creative and IT skills through 
polytechnic education, an opportunity not taken up locally where the local polytechnic became an under-
funded branch of a multi-campus East-Anglian university (Anglia Ruskin University). Support to Anglia 
Ruskin University in the creative arts and commerce could stimulate commercial capabilities in creative 
industries in the area. 
 
The Biotech5 and R&D sectors have consistently had the highest number of employees. Biotech firm 
numbers in early years were inflated by inclusion of research institutes.  The sector expanded rapidly in 
the 1990s but experienced decreasing firm numbers after 2000 and lower employment after 2002 as the 
financial climate become less favourable to these firms.  The erratic growth paths of seven biotech firms 
that ceased trading in the area are illustrative (Figure 12). Job numbers in science based ‘development’ 
companies reflect inputs to an immature resource base, often reliant on venture capital and not yet 
generating sales or profits. 
 
The research and development sector continued to show an increase in firm and job numbers, as we see 
below. Not all specialist sectors of activity are captured by SIC codes.  Two important activities in the 
area are ink jet printing and technical design consultancies which provide technical development services 
to customers (also known as contract research companies). Five of the inkjet printing firms6 in the area 
expanded from 297 employees in 1988, to 840 employees in 1998, and up to 1055 employees in 2008.  
There were intermittent discontinuities in employment growth as firms encountered and overcame 
                                                
3 Routine retail e-business that did not use leading edge technologies are not included in the database. 
4 A successful exception is Abcam, which provided antibodies over the internet for the biopharm industry. 
5 Note: Unlike other sector categories, Biotech is not an SIC-based category and there is some overlap with other 
categories. 
6 These specialist activities were identified on a firm by firm in the database, where employment data was available.  
Five of the largest ink jet printing firms were used in this sample.  
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difficulties, but there was no contraction in the steady accumulation of technical competence, as revealed 
by numbers of patents registered by five of these firms. 
 
Figure 12  Growth paths of larger Biotechs that closed or left before 2006 
 
 
Figure 13  Cumulative patents between 1985 and 2008  for Inkjet Printing Firms 
 
 
Source:  European Patent Office 
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In the case of technical design consultancies, the four largest have grown from a total of 695 employees 
in 1988 to 1125 employees in 1998 and to 1375 employees in 2008.  
 
Figure 14  Cumulative patents between 1985 and 2008 for Technical Design Consultancies 
 
 
Source:  European Patent Office 
 
The IP built up by the technical design companies is one reason why they have been a fertile source of 
spin-outs in the area, with most of the IJP companies originating in Cambridge Consultants Ltd. 
(Garnsey and Heffernan 2005). Patents are merely a quantifiable indicator of a broader range of business 
and technical competence, the key advantage of the longstanding Cambridge technology firms. 
 
Ten year trends. 
We now turn to the question of decade-long trends in size and sectoral activity of technology firms in the 
Cambridge area. The database evidence examined here does not reflect directly on the issue of whether 
congestion has made Cambridge a less attractive place to do business, but this issue requires, as a start, 
analysis over a longer period than the recent boom and contraction.  Our aim here is to examine recent 
data in longer term perspective; trend lines are drawn for the period of data availability 1988-2006. 
(Figure 15, Figure 16).7 The hump of expansion during the boom years 1996-2004 was followed by 
decline in firm numbers. Whether this reflects a return to the earlier pre-boom trend or further decline 
will depend on the severity of the recession and whether firms founded in the adverse conditions of 
recession prove as robust as were the cohorts of the early 1990s. 
   
                                                
7 Some recent changes are missed in the survey and added to the database subsequently. 
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Figure 15  Boom and stabilisation by sector - Trend line for IT software firm numbers  
 
 
 
Figure 16  Total number of firms, IT software and microfirms with trend lines 1988-2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 14 
Merger and Acquisition trends 
Cambridge technology firms are attractive targets for acquisition by corporations seeking to improve 
their innovation performance by buying a promising technology and/ or innovative team. Figure 17 
presents the trend in acquisitions in four sectors: telecoms, IT software, instruments and biotechnology.  
Together these sectors account for the majority of takeovers identifiable in the database since 1988, 
though further takeovers not flagged in the database have been found from other sources for these 
sectors.8 On this evidence, the level of acquisitions increased markedly during the period of the 
technology boom after 1996. Acquisition rates rose to a peak at the height of the boom in 1999/2000 in 
telecoms, IT software, and biotechnology but remained stable in the more mature instrumentation sector. 
The increase in acquisition numbers is likely to reflect the rapid expansion of venture capital investments 
in the area, since venture capitalists, being intermediaries, are under pressure to exit early to achieve 
returns for their investors. While there was little VC investment in Cambridge firms before the 
international technology boom, local tech firms attracted over £250m in VC in 2000 and £300 million in 
VC in 2001. Investment by VCs in local companies fell to around £150 million in 2003 and to under £50 
million in 2006 according to an investment consultancy (Library House 2006; Appendix A).  It is not 
clear whether local acquisitions trends are consequent on local VC investments, annual acquisitions in 
each sector are small numbers and the period of lag before acquisition is variable. 
 
Figure 17  M&A Transactions by Year, 1994-2006 in biotechnology, IT software, instruments and 
telecommunications  
 
 
 
 
                                                
8   We are indebted to Vivian Mohr  who combed the database firms in the main sectors for takeovers, checking the 
data against web sources, company histories, backed by direct inquiries, making it possible to present the first 
cluster-wide data available on acquisitions in the Cambridge area. 
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To assess the local impact of acquisition, flows of capital into the area and the impact on jobs and firm 
numbers would, ideally, be examined, but the recipients of capital flows (whether locals or externals) are 
unknown. Relatively few companies provide performance figures for an acquired unit, but it proved 
possible to find such data for 47 acquired units. Table 1 summarises the proportion of units in which 
expansion occurred pre- and post-acquisition for the firms providing evidence. The majority of acquired 
units were expanding before takeover, firms acquired being those in the area with best performance and 
prospects. The proportion of target units continuing to grow after takeover was lower than before 
takeover in biotech and IT firms. Net contraction occurred after acquisition in instruments and telecomm 
firms. There were job losses in all four sectors following acquisition of these firms, most noticeably in 
the telecommunication sector (Table 1).  
 
Table 1  Impact of Acquisition on Employment in 47 Acquired Units in the Cambridge Technology Cluster 1994-
2006    
 
Sector Acquired 
units for 
which 
data are 
available 
Average  
rate of 
employ-
ment 
growth 
before unit  
acquired 
Average  
rate of 
employ-
ment 
growth 
after unit  
acquired 
Net 
employment 
change after 
acquisition 
(number of 
jobs) 
Biotech 7 74% 7% -261 
Instruments 6 1% -2% -305 
Telecom 8 63% -16% -689 
IT 26 51% 10% -110 
All   47   -1365 
 
 
For those firms issuing performance figures for acquired units, there were 1365 fewer jobs after 
acquisition than there had been when these firms (in biotech, instruments, IT software and telecoms 
sectors) were independent. We do not know what would have occurred had the firms remained 
independent, nor whether changes resulted from productivity improvements, strategic reorientation or 
loss of custom. In the case of biotechnology firms engaged in labour intensive research and development, 
productivity improvements are an unlikely explanation of contraction. Case study evidence indicates that 
strategic reorientation by the acquirer is the most usual driver of change in the acquired unit. 
Acquisitions often result in spin-outs of new companies, but downsizing on this scale was not matched 
by jobs created in newly formed firms spun out by employees, given the small size of most start-ups. 
Acquired units become branch firms, subject to subsequent closure and relocation as identified earlier, 
while spin-outs may subsequently expand. 
 
Economic Volatility and Activity in Emerging Sectors 
The fall in national output after 2003 was followed by expansion fuelled by the property boom, ended by 
the financial crisis. This has been a period of economic volatility in the nation at large (Figure 18).   The 
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pattern of expansion and contraction among Cambridge firms did not mirror these trends because there 
were other factors at work such as availability of venture capital. 
Figure 18  Economic volatility measured by changes in GDP growth in the UK 
 
 
Source:  Office of National Statistics 
 
Figure 19 reflects volatile share price performance in the UK. The bi-modal trend since 1999 reflects the 
loss of confidence following the technology crash and recovery of confidence related to the property 
boom. Property boom effects may be reflected in all VAT registered start-ups in Cambridgeshire at large 
which, as we have seen, remained higher than the rate of entry of technology based Cambridge start-ups 
through to 2007 (GCP 2007), but this  “bounce” was not experienced by the Cambridge technology 
cluster firms. 
 
Figure 19  Economic volatility in UK measured by FTSE Allshare Index 
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Source FTSE (chart courtesy of V. Mohr) 
 
Questions that arise include whether the Cambridge tech firms’ experience prefigured the credit crunch 
that later hit the wider economy and whether they will show renewed resilience.  We have seen that the 
Cambridge cluster remained relatively immune to the slump of the early 1990s, with new firms arising to 
provide jobs lost in the established firms. Cambridge firms may show resilience again, particularly those 
developing technologies of the future. However the decline of the instrumentation sector of the early 
1990s after decades during which this was the main tech sector in the area had very serious 
consequences. Instrumentation is a major sector in Route 128 and in Silicon Valley. This is a sector in 
which Cambridge firms should have advantages through close links with leading edge labs, but has 
become a small local sector engaged in niche activity.  The experience of the instruments sector thus 
shows the danger of lasting impact on key sectors of a recession especially when this is combined with 
constraints on the carrying capacity of the area resulting from congestion and infrastructure issues.  
 
The decline in numbers and jobs in biotechnology reflect conditions in the capital market as experienced 
in the pharmaceutical sector as well as internal business development issues.   In the environmental 
goods and services sector there was a period of  inflated share prices on the Alternative Investment 
Market (AiM), followed by a disproportionate slump from 2007. One Cambridge-based firm was left 
with cash worth over twice what the market capitalisation had fallen to on AiM. Investors first held and 
then revised unrealistic expectations regarding prospects for short term returns in the clean tech sector.  
 
We saw that during recent years venture capital became more plentiful in the Cambridge area. However, 
at most 10% of tech firms in the Cambridge area were funded by VC (Library House 2006). Young firms 
continued to need access to bank credit. Former bankers working in the area report that during recent 
years, the highly centralised UK banks were tightening credit for tech based firms, making it very 
difficult or impossible for local tech based firms to obtain overdrafts. Credit of the kind that had funded 
Cambridge firms like Domino Printing Sciences and Acorn Computers in earlier decades had become 
unobtainable (Herriott et al 2008).  This may have reflected banks’ preference for loans to the mortgage 
sector following the deregulation of the banks and building societies, particularly during the period of 
property boom. Interviews with former bankers indicate that the key shortage was of bankers 
knowledgeable about technology firms. According to David Gill who was head of the Innovation Unit at 
HSBC “The resource being constrained was not money primarily but people (dedicated tech specialists).” 
Specialised technology teams were closed down in banks after the tech boom. “By the time the property 
market started to overheat from 2004, there was no incentive (for banks) to build long-term firms.” The 
topic requires further investigation. 
 
Cambridge has benefited from the continued flow of funds and talent through the university, which is 
more immune to recession than most organisations (Shahid and Kaora, 2007). There are over 300 firms 
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directly originating from the university in the area (Garnsey and Heffernan 2002). These are particularly 
vulnerable in their first years and so would be very sensitive to financial conditions.  
 
We saw that the expansion of the technology cluster depends on entries exceeding exits and on the 
survival and growth of cluster firms. We have seen that the distribution of firms is not less favourable in 
terms of size than that found nationally, and that since 2000 over 70 firms grew to reach the largest size 
category. It is also of interest to compare survival rates of firms started in the Cambridge area in 
succeeding periods (Figure 20). The survival rates for Cambridge high tech firms were unusually high, 
and exceeded rates for all East Anglia firms9 and UK firms (Garnsey and Heffernan 2005). Cambridge 
high tech firms performed well collectively in comparison to county data and national data. The lower 
rates for firms founded in the boom years are identifiable in Figure 19. Only firms with better prospects 
may have been founded in the recession of the early 1990s and these benefited from the economic 
expansion later in the decade. This historical precedent shows that the long term effects of the fall in 
start-up rates after 2004 could be remedied if survival rates improved. 
 
Figure 20  Survival Rates by Cohort of Cambridge High Tech Firms 
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New Activity 
Whether trends will recover in the Cambridge technology cluster will depend heavily on the success of 
new activity, such as occurred in the early 1990s when job losses in older companies were replaced by 
new jobs in emerging sectors.  Newcomer firms spinning out from the university or starting up in the 
local enterprise centres may prefigure future trends as regards emerging tech-based activities.  The 
websites of Cambridge Enterprise, St. Johns Innovation Centre and the Science Park were examined to 
see how many firms engaged in new types of activity have entered their directories (Table 2.) This is 
                                                
9 http://stats.berr.gov.uk/ed/survival/ 
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only a partial audit of firms in new sectors, but provides evidence of a shift into new activity during a 
period when the number of start-ups was contracting. 
 
Table 2  Emerging sector firms associated with Cambridge Enterprise, St. Johns Innovation Centre, Cambridge 
Science Park  
 
Total Number of Emerging sector firms from Cambridge Enterprise, St. Johns 
Innovation Centre and the Cambridge Science Park 
35 
  
  Number of Firms 
Display Technology 6 
Energy, Environment, Sustainability 7 
New/Intelligent Materials 8 
Consulting for Emerging Sectors 1 
Web/Media 13 
 
http://www.enterprise.cam.ac.uk/equityportfolio.php 
http://www.stjohns.co.uk/welcome/tenants/tenants.html  
http://www.cambridgesciencepark.co.uk/companies/110/full-list  
 
 
The seven new firms with environmental technologies are accompanied by firms in other sectors (e.g. 
materials, R&D) with potential applications for the natural environment. Firms engaged in R&D are 
harbingers of new activity and these were found to be increasing in number, by over a hundred in five 
years. 
 
Table 3  R&D firms founded between 2000 and 2006 
 
Total Number of R&D firms founded between 2000 and 2006 101 
  
Breakdown Number of Firms 
Medical Research and Development 23 
Bioinformatics 8 
Information and Communication Research and Development 15 
Energy and Environment 14 
Display 7 
Materials 6 
Printing 3 
Other (Manufacturing, Leisure, safety and security, media, consultants etc. 25 
 
 
Reflections and further work 
  A database of all high tech firms in the Cambridge area has been used here to trace the growth 
of firms in diverse sectors. We have shown that a local firm’s longevity is important to the 
accumulation of local competencies. In previous papers we have shown that many of the high 
tech firms in the area originated in the university, while others were attracted to the area or were 
encouraged by the success of others to start in Cambridge on an independent basis (Garnsey and 
Heffernan 2005). There has been flow of talented and knowledgeable people who have found 
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ways to apply knowledge to new areas of activity, a key stimulus to the Cambridge technology 
cluster. Competence accumulates through successive spin-outs of knowledge-based firms, as 
well as within specific firms. To trace the impact of firms originating in the university it is not 
enough to look at the first generation of firms. Spin-outs from previous spin-out firms create 
new clusters of activity over time. We have traced the development of new clusters, the 
Cambridge ink jet printing cluster and the ensuing display technology cluster, which originated 
from one university spin out firm, CCL. Competence can be transferred from one application to 
another, resulting in the emergence of new activity.  Ink jet printing has proved to be more than 
a printing technology. It is now seen to be a deposition technology that can transform the way in 
which intelligent materials are created. One promising example is the display technology 
cluster, with high-growth start-ups like Cambridge Display Technology and Plastic Logic. New 
applications of the principles on which their technologies depend can give rise to environmental 
innovations.  
 
Technology based enterprises commercialise knowledge with transformative potential that 
reveals itself over time. Today many Cambridge firms are developing innovations with actual or 
potential applications to environmental products and services. New companies need customers 
for their innovations. Government procurement of innovative products and services could 
demonstrate their value and stimulate private sector demand. In the Netherlands, all products 
procured by government will have to achieve high standards of sustainability by 2012, a  way of 
stimulating demand for environmental innovation.  
 
Demand for innovative products, capital for innovation and skilled and enterprising people are 
the ingredients for sustaining an innovative cluster. Continued support for scientific and 
engineering research in grants for doctoral and post-doctoral research   are critical. Since quality 
of life has been a key attraction for the latter, neglected infrastructure and unrelieved congestion 
must be addressed. Local problem-solving by those most closely affected is hampered by 
centralisation of decision-making and of budgets and by the lack of integrated city development 
(Parkinson et al.   2006).  
 
As regards the availability of capital, in real value-creation there is delay and new firms lack 
retained earnings to tide them over.   Value-creating companies must be able to access credit and 
external finance. Returns captured by technology investors from specific companies tend to be 
highly cyclical, setting off further cycles of funding availability.   We have seen that Cambridge 
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technology based firms are highly sensitive to cyclical trends in the economy. Though resilient 
over a quarter of a century, they have been showing signs of contraction since the technology 
downturn. While credit was available, they were subject to pressure from the financial sector to 
achieve value-capture more rapidly than was feasible. Unless these firms have the funds to 
create new value for users, financial value-capture cannot be sustained. 
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Appendix A  Venture Capital Funds attracted by Cambridge Companies, 2000-2006  
 
 
 
Source Library House, 2006, The Supercluster Question, The Cambridge Cluster Report 2006, Library House Cambridge  
Reproduced with permission. 
 
 
Appendix B  Cambridgeshire High-tech Database 
 
The records on the Cambridgeshire County  Council on the population of high tech firms in the county 
were used to create a database of high-tech firms, derived from biennial surveys of employment in local 
firms. This is the basis for the evidence analysed here tracking employment data by firm over a twenty 
year period.  The firms’ self-description of activities is used to identify knowledge intensive (“high 
tech”) activity and to assign this to standard industrial categories. The Cambridge County Council 
Research Group has been collecting employment data for all the high-tech firms in Cambridgeshire and 
Peterborough since 1985, for the purpose of monitoring the region’s employment development and 
trends. The dataset contained information on around 3000 high-tech firms, where high-tech refers to 
firms with high-tech inputs (1) R&D budget (2) above average proportion of science and technology 
employees (3) firms that by their activity description use emerging and newly-diffusing technology. 
These data were refined to remove university departments, retailing and other units that were not directly 
relevant to the analysis of high-tech business.   
 
The county employers’database includes Peterborough companies but as these are not part of the high 
tech locality around Cambridge they are excluded in the aggregate figures reported here. It was found 
that inclusion and exclusion of Peterborough companies made little difference to aggregate trends since 
there are relatively few high tech companies in the Peterborough area. The database we have been using 
includes research institutes with sizeable private industry funding. When the analysis was carried out 
again excluding such institutes, it was found that the major trends were not affected.  The number of 
biotech employees is higher in the 1980s when research institutes are included. The biotech firms are 
flagged as such in the database; sectoral distribution based on SIC does not identify biotech separately. 
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